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Policy Considerations and Implications in 






In United States v. Bryant, the Supreme Court unanimously decided to both narrow 
the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to legal representation, and reinforce and 
strengthen tribal sovereignty and the legitimacy of the tribal court system.1 The decision 
came at a time when the Court was only eight justices strong, and 4-4 splits along 
ideological lines left important issues in a sort of limbo: considered to have reached their 
final disposition, but without an opinion from the highest Court.2 The issues presented in 
Bryant seemed likely to result in yet another split. The disposition of the case would 
either expand federal power over Native American tribes or diminish it, and the case was 
granted certiorari due to a circuit split.3 What, then, drove the Court to decide 
unanimously in favor of the federal government? 
One explanation may be the important policy considerations at play in this case. 
The issue at the heart of Bryant was whether uncounseled tribal court convictions could 
be used to support a conviction based on a federal recidivism statute without violating the 
Sixth Amendment.4 However, greater issues were at stake. The federal statute in question 
allowed for offenders who were repeatedly convicted of domestic violence on Native 
American reservations to be charged with a federal crime.5 This statute serves an 
important purpose because tribal courts are limited in their power to punish offenders on 
reservations and because domestic violence poses a disproportionately high risk to Native 
American women.6  
Violence against Native American women is an issue that was both prevalent and 
overlooked by the justice system until very recently, and to some extent still is.7 In 
passing the newest version of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), and with it the 
                                                 
1 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). 
2 See generally Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2016); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. 
Ct. 1083 (2016); United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016); Adam Liptak, Larry Buchanan & Alicia 
Parlapiano, How a Vacancy on the Supreme Court Affected Cases in the 2015–2016 Term, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/14/us/politics/how-scalias-death-could-
affect-major-supreme-court-cases-in-the-2016-term.html. 
3 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1964. 
4 Id. at 1956. 
5 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012). 
6 See General Guide to Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, TRIBAL L. & POL’Y INST.: TRIBAL CT. 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/jurisdiction.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).  
7 See Using the Declaration to End Violence Against Native Women, INDIAN L. RESOURCE CTR., 
http://indianlaw.org/content/using-declaration-end-violence-against-native-women (last visited Mar. 5, 
2018). 
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statute allowing for repeat offenders to be prosecuted federally, the federal government 
took long-overdue steps to correct the massive problem of violence against Native 
American women. It did so by allowing the federal government to impose longer 
sentences than tribal courts can for offenders who commit multiple acts of domestic 
violence against Native American women.8 
The strength of the positions of both the petitioner and respondent in Bryant 
suggest that there had to have been considerations outside the precedential reasoning in 
the opinion that swayed the Court to not only decide in favor of the United States, but to 
do so unanimously. Taking into account the magnitude of the public policy issues at 
stake, it is logical to point to policy considerations as being substantially responsible for 
the Court’s unanimous decision in Bryant. The Court in Bryant decided unanimously in 
favor of preserving protections granted to Native American women by VAWA not 
because the Constitution demanded it, but because the Court was aware of the policy 
implications of this case. 
The obvious public policy consideration in Bryant is how to best protect Native 
American women from domestic violence. However, any case that has a significant 
impact on the relationship between federal courts and tribal courts also has an impact on 
the overall sovereignty of Native American tribes. From the majority and concurring 
opinions, it is clear that the Court was aware of both sets of policy concerns. The nature 
of this case was such that the Court had to choose between these concerns—either more 
sovereignty for the tribes or stronger protections for Native American women. In this 
instance, the Court chose stronger protections for Native American women at the expense 
of tribal sovereignty. This Note seeks to understand the Court’s reasons for choosing one 
policy concern over the other and to explore how this decision could impact the Native 
American community. 
 
a. Background—Tribal Courts 
 
To understand the significance of the Court’s decision in Bryant, it is important to 
understand the position of tribal courts in the American legal landscape. Native American 
tribes are legally considered “domestic dependent nations.”9 This unique legal 
classification means that tribes are “in some ways more autonomous than states and in 
other respects less so.”10 It is this status of semi-sovereignty that allowed for the 
formation of the tribal court system. The singular and contradictory sovereignty given to 
Native American tribes also forms the basis of much of Justice Thomas’s concurrence in 
Bryant.11 
                                                 
8 Compare General Guide to Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, supra note 6 (“The Indian Civil 
Rights Act . . . provides that tribal court cannot ‘impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or 
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year or a fine of $5,000 or both.’”), with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 117(a) (“[A]n offense . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for a term of not more than 5 years, or 
both, except that if substantial bodily injury results from violation under this section, the offender shall be 
imprisoned for a term of not more than 10 years.”). 
9 Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 
1502 (2013). 
10 Id. 
11 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1967 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 




Originally, tribes had complete jurisdiction over their territories. State law did not 
govern tribal lands, and tribes had jurisdiction over all people, Native and non-Native 
alike, who were physically on tribal lands—a relationship much like one between the 
United States and a foreign nation.12 “Native people had methods of resolving disputes 
prior to the introduction of Anglo law to the North American continent,” and prior to the 
formalization of tribal courts and tribal laws, these dispute-resolution methods were what 
governed all people on tribal lands for all matters.13 This authority came from the idea 
that, as sovereign entities, tribes were “qualified to exercise powers of self-government, 
not by virtue of any delegation of powers from the Federal government but rather by 
reason of their original tribal sovereignty.”14  
Over time, the Supreme Court began limiting the jurisdiction of tribal justice 
systems, finding that states had some jurisdiction over tribes, particularly with respect to 
criminal law and crimes involving non-Native people.15 One of the earliest attempts by 
the federal government to exercise jurisdiction over Native American tribal lands 
involved a case where a member of the Lakota tribe, Crow Dog, killed another member 
of his tribe.16 The Lakota had already punished Crow Dog according to their traditional 
methods, which involved him paying restitution to the victim’s family.17 The Supreme 
Court held that the treaty between the tribe and the federal government allowed the tribe 
to adjudicate the matter by its own methods.18 Congress responded to this case by 
enacting the Major Crimes Act, “giving the federal courts the authority to prosecute 
Indians who commit certain major crimes on reservations,” in an attempt to correct a 
perceived lawlessness in the Native American tribes.19 This was just one action among 
many the federal government took following Crow Dog to reduce tribal sovereignty and 
gain jurisdiction over tribal lands.20 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 allowed tribes “to set up their own justice 
codes and operate court systems enforcing tribal laws enacted by Indian tribes.”21 Tribal 
courts, therefore, exist under the authority of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, not 
Article III of the Constitution, which created federal and state courts.22 Not all tribes 
chose to write their own code, and not all tribes chose to operate their own court 
                                                 
12 Florey, supra note 9, at 1502. 
13 B.J. JONES, CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, INDIAN COUNTRY CHILD TRAUMA CTR., ROLE OF INDIAN 
TRIBAL COURTS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2000), http://www.icctc.org/Tribal%20Courts.pdf. 
14 David E. Wilkins, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Explication of “Federal Plenary Power”: An Analysis of 
Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty, 1886–1914, 18 AM. INDIAN Q. 349, 349–50 (1994). 
15 Florey, supra note 9, at 1519. 
16 Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 556 (1883). The opinion refers to the tribe as “Sioux,” however, 
“Sioux” is a name derived from the Chippewa word for “snake,” and was given to the tribe after the 
neighboring Chippewa identified the tribe as such to explorers. The “Sioux” in fact consists of three tribes- 
the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota. Crow Dog belonged to the Lakota tribe. See Maurice G. Smith, Indian 
Tribal Names, 5 AMERICAN SPEECH 114, 115–16 (1929).   
17 JONES, supra note 13, at 4. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 4 n.9.  
20 See Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts to Protect 
Native American Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CAL. L. REV. 185, 198 (2008). 
21 JONES, supra note 13, at 5. 
22 Id. 
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systems.23 These tribes “operate by the Code of Indian Offenses found in the Code of 
Federal Regulations [(CFR)]” and resolve disputes in courts operated by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs.24 For the most part, tribal courts function procedurally similarly to federal 
and state courts.25 Tribal courts “use sworn testimony, keep a record of court proceedings 
and use both a judge and jury system to decide cases.”26  
 




Michael Bryant Jr. is a member of the Northern Cheyenne tribe.27 Between 1997 
and 2007, he was convicted over 100 times in tribal courts, including five instances in 
which he pled guilty to domestic violence charges.28 In 2011, Bryant was convicted of 
domestic violence against two women.29 In one instance, Bryant repeatedly kicked and 
punched his then-girlfriend.30 He admitted to the police after being arrested that this was 
the fifth or sixth time that he had assaulted his girlfriend.31 Three months after this 
conviction, Bryant was convicted of domestic violence again, this time against his new 
girlfriend of two months.32 He choked her until she lost consciousness and told police 
that over the course of their two-month relationship, he had assaulted her multiple 
times.33 
Bryant was indicted on federal charges of domestic assault by a habitual offender.34 
The statute under which Bryant was indicted provides that offenders who have been 
convicted of domestic assault in the United States, including in tribal courts, on at least 
two separate occasions may be charged under the federal statute and sentenced to up to 
five years in prison upon their conviction for a third assault.35 Bryant, represented by 
counsel, moved to dismiss on the basis that his prior, uncounseled convictions in tribal 
court could not be used to charge him under § 117(a) without violating the Sixth 
Amendment.36 The district court denied Bryant’s motion, and he pled guilty.37 On appeal 
of the motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit reversed and directed the lower court to 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 7. 
26 Id. 
27 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1963. 
28 Id. 




33 Id. It should be noted that non-fatal strangulation is a significant predictor of future homicide or 
attempted homicide in abusive relationships. See Nancy Glass, Kathryn Laughon, Jacquelyn Campbell, 
Anna D. Wolf Chair, Carolyn Rebecca Block, Ginger Hanson, Phyllis W. Sharps & Ellen Taliaferro, Non-
Fatal Strangulation is an Important Risk Factor for Homicide of Women (Oct. 1, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Journal of Emergency Medicine). 
34 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1963.  
35 18 U.S.C. § 117(a). 
36 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1957. 
37 Id. 




dismiss the indictment, finding that because Bryant’s tribal court convictions would have 
been in violation of the Sixth Amendment had they been tried in state or federal courts, 
they could not be used for purposes of indicting Bryant under § 117(a).38  
 
b. Circuit Split 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bryant because the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit created a circuit split between the Ninth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.39 Both the 
Eighth and Tenth Circuits had previously held that “tribal-court convictions, valid at their 
inception, and not alleged to be otherwise unreliable, may be used to prove the elements 
of § 117(a).”40  
The Eighth Circuit had considered the issue in United States v. Cavanaugh.41 The 
facts in Cavanaugh are very similar to the facts in Bryant. Cavanaugh was charged with 
domestic assault by a habitual offender under § 117(a) in federal court after being 
convicted of misdemeanor abuse in tribal court on three occasions without being 
represented by counsel.42 Because Cavanaugh’s tribal court convictions were 
uncounseled, the district court dismissed the indictment under § 117(a) as it was in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.43 The federal government then 
appealed to the Eighth Circuit.44 Unlike in Bryant, Cavanaugh argued that his tribal court 
convictions were invalid because he was not given court-appointed counsel.45 The district 
court and the Eighth Circuit both found this argument to be meritless, noting that it had 
long been established in Indian law46 that “the Constitution does not apply to restrict the 
actions of Indian tribes as separate, quasi-sovereign bodies.”47 The Eighth Circuit noted 
that under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), tribal courts are only required to appoint 
counsel for indigent defendants if the defendant faces a sentence of incarceration for 
more than one year.48 Since Cavanaugh was only charged with misdemeanor offenses 
and “the Indian Civil Rights Act does not impose upon tribes a duty to provide counsel 
for indigent misdemeanor defendants,” he did not have a right to appointed counsel in 
tribal court, and the Eighth Circuit held that his prior convictions were valid.49 
The Eighth Circuit then moved on to the question of whether the tribal court 
convictions, being valid, could be used to indict Cavanaugh under § 117(a). The court 
relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nichols v. United States, in which the Court held 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1964. 
40 Id. (citing United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotations omitted). 
41 643 F.3d at 597. 
42 Id. at 593. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 594. 
45 Id. at 595. 
46 This Note uses the term “Indian law” to refer to the body of law pertaining to Native American tribes and 
reservations. Although the use of the term “Indian” is problematic in reference to Native American peoples, 
the term “Indian law” has long been used to refer to this area of law and is commonly found in court 
opinions and statutes. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 596. 
49 Id. at 595. 
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that uncounseled prior convictions that were valid because they had not resulted in 
incarceration could be used in a conviction for enhancement purposes.50 The court 
reasoned that because Cavanaugh’s prior convictions were not in violation of the 
Constitution, charging him under § 117(a) was also not in violation of the Constitution.51 
The Tenth Circuit considered the issue in another case with a strikingly similar fact 
pattern: United States v. Shavanaux.52 Shavanaux, like Bryant and Cavanaugh, was a 
member of a Native American tribe who was charged under § 117(a) after having been 
previously convicted on multiple occasions of domestic assault on a Native American 
reservation.53 Shavanaux was also uncounseled when he was convicted in tribal court.54 
The Tenth Circuit noted, “because the Bill of Rights does not constrain Indian tribes, 
Shavanaux’s prior uncounseled tribal convictions could not violate the Sixth 
Amendment,” and, “thus, use of Shavanaux’s prior convictions in a prosecution under 
§ 117(a) would not violate the Sixth Amendment.”55 
Cavanaugh and Shavanaux were decided just twenty days apart by the Eighth and 
Tenth Circuits in 2011.56 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Bryant came three years later in 
September 2014 and created the circuit split.57 The Ninth Circuit based its reversal of 
Bryant’s conviction on a 1989 case it had decided, United States v. Ant.58 In Ant, the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that “if Ant’s earlier guilty plea had been made in a court other 
than in a tribal court, it would not be admissible in the subsequent federal prosecution 
absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,” and since the guilty plea would have violated 
the Sixth Amendment if it were made in state or federal court, “such a plea is 
inadmissible in a federal prosecution.”59 In Bryant, the Ninth Circuit took notice of the 
holding in Nichols that “an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid . . . because no 
prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent 
conviction.”60 However, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Bryant and Ant from Nichols by 
pointing out that “Nichols involved a prior conviction that did comport with the Sixth 
Amendment, whereas this case involves prior convictions obtained under procedures that, 
if utilized in state or federal court, would have violated the Sixth Amendment.”61 The 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged the creation of the circuit split with its decision in Bryant, 
but noted that Ant was binding precedent, and that Cavanaugh and Shavanaux could not 




                                                 
50 Id. at 599. 
51 Id. at 604–05.  
52 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011). 
53 Id. at 995. 
54 Id. at 996.  
55 Id. at 997–98.   
56 See generally id.; Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 952. 
57 See United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014). 
58 Id. at 677 (citing United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
59 Ant, 882 F.2d at 1394–95. 
60 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1963 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994)). 
61 Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677. 
62 Id. at 678. 





c. Legal Backdrop 
 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, began her discussion of the issues in Bryant 
by acknowledging that domestic violence is a serious problem for Native American 
women. The Court outlined some of the relevant statistics, showing that Native American 
women are one of the groups most vulnerable to intimate partner violence.63 It went on to 
note that domestic abusers have an abnormally high rate of recidivism, with attacks often 
escalating until the domestic abuser commits murder.64  
The Court also pointed out the difficulty in punishing domestic assaults perpetrated 
against Native American women due to the complexity of Indian law.65 Tribal courts 
have jurisdiction over Native American defendants, as was the case in Bryant. However, 
as stated above, Congress has limited the sentencing ability of tribal courts. The Court 
noted that ICRA only allowed tribal courts to impose up to one year of incarceration, and 
more recent legislation allowed for tribal courts to sentence for up to three years if they 
adopt “additional procedural safeguards.”66 These procedural safeguards include 
providing the defendant assistance of counsel equal to what is required by the Sixth 
Amendment; providing indigent defendants with counsel at the expense of the tribal 
government; requiring the judge to have legal training and be licensed to practice law in 
the United States; publishing criminal laws, rules of evidence, and rules of criminal 
procedure of the tribal government; and maintaining a record of any criminal 
proceedings.67 The Court emphasized that “few tribes have employed this enhanced 
sentencing authority,” meaning that for most tribal courts, the reality is that the maximum 
sentence they can impose is one-year imprisonment.68 
In addition to the complexity of the jurisdictional and sentencing issues, the Court 
went on to note that states have some limited capability of exercising jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by Native Americans on Native American land but that states rarely 
take advantage of this capability.69 The result is that the federal government is left to pick 
up the slack left by state inaction and Congressional limitations on tribal sentencing and 
enforcement power. In most cases, Congress has not allowed for federal court jurisdiction 
over crimes committed by a Native American against another Native American.70 The 
Major Crimes Act allowed federal jurisdiction over a finite number of offenses when the 
offender and victim are both Native American.71 The Court made a point of noting that 
those crimes included are only the most serious, limited to “murder, manslaughter, and 
felony assault.”72 At the time, federal prosecution of felony assault required “serious 
bodily injury, meaning a substantial risk of death, extreme physical pain, protracted and 
                                                 
63 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1959. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1960.  
67 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2010). 
68 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1960. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.; see also Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571–72. 
71 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1961. 
72 Id. (citing Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153) (internal quotations omitted). 
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obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily 
member, organ, or mental faculty.”73 The Court correctly recognized that the result of the 
above factors is that “serial domestic violence offenders, prior to the enactment of 
§ 117(a), faced at most one year’s imprisonment per offense—a sentence insufficient to 
deter repeated and escalating abuse.”74 This insufficiency was what spurred Congress to 
enact § 117(a).75 
After outlining the stakes by describing the problem in the Native American 
community of domestic assault and the difficulties associated with reducing it, the Court 
went on to discuss the issue central to this case: whether explicit inclusion of tribal court 
convictions in § 117(a) could be reconciled with the Sixth Amendment.76 The Court 
reasoned that Native American tribes are generally not subject to Constitutional 
provisions that limit state or federal authority. However, ICRA did impose some 
protections for tribal court defendants that are similar to, but not the same as, the Bill of 
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment.77 
One of the protections that ICRA granted to defendants is the right for indigent 
defendants to be represented by counsel at the expense of the tribal government if the 
tribal court imposes a sentence of incarceration for more than one year.78 Thus, the 
question central to Bryant and the circuit split is whether convictions obtained in 
compliance with ICRA can be used to charge a defendant under § 117(a). In Burgett v. 
Texas, the Court held that a conviction obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment 
could not be used to convict a defendant under a recidivist statute similar to § 117(a).79 
To allow such a conviction based on wrongfully uncounseled prior convictions, even if 
the defendant is counseled for the charges based on the recidivist statute, would be a 
further violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.80 In the words of the Court, 
it “would cause the accused in effect to suffer anew from the prior deprivation of his 
Sixth Amendment right.”81 
The Court went on to say that Nichols placed a limitation on Burgett.82 According 
to the Court, Nichols limits Burgett because it held that an uncounseled misdemeanor, 
valid because the prior conviction resulted in only a fine and no jail time, could be used 
in a subsequent conviction to enhance punishment.83 
 
d. Reasoning and Holding 
 
Bryant did not attempt to dispute that his prior uncounseled convictions were 
valid.84 Bryant’s argument for affirming the reversal of his conviction was that had his 
                                                 
73 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1962. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. (citing Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115). 
82 Id. at 1963. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1963–64. 




tribal court convictions been handed down by a state or federal court, they would have 
been invalid and could not have been used to charge him under § 117(a).85  
The Court cited Nichols as the basis for its reasoning in this case.86 Part of the 
Court’s reasoning for its holding in Nichols was that recidivist or enhancement statutes 
do not punish an offender again for crimes previously committed, but only punish for the 
most recent crime with which the defendant is charged.87 For this reason, a conviction’s 
validity carries over to subsequent proceedings.88 
Because Bryant was not sentenced to more than one year in his prior convictions 
and because he was granted counsel in his federal court case, the Court found that he was 
not denied his Sixth Amendment rights at any point. The Court reasoned that to find 
otherwise would cause tribal court convictions to be valid for the sentence imposed, but 
invalid for enhancing a later sentence or bringing charges under a recidivist statute.89 
Such a contradiction would be undesirable. 
The Court reconciled this decision with Burgett by holding that Burgett only 
disallowed the use of an uncounseled conviction in later criminal proceedings if the 
uncounseled convictions were in violation of the Sixth Amendment.90 Since the Court 
already held that Bryant’s Sixth Amendment rights were never violated in his tribal-court 
convictions by virtue of the fact that he had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
tribal court, the Court found no conflict with Burgett.91 
In closing, the Court held that because Bryant’s tribal-court convictions were in 
accordance with the requirements placed on tribal courts by ICRA, they were valid when 
entered and are valid for purposes of indictment under § 117(a).92 The Court reversed the 




Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, stating that the Court’s opinion was 
correct based on precedent.94 He continued, however, by noting that the case itself was an 
example of “how far afield our Sixth Amendment and Indian-law precedents have 
gone.”95 Justice Thomas first argued that the Court’s opinion in Burgett created greater 
protections than the Sixth Amendment calls for, since all that the Sixth Amendment 
requires is for a defendant to be granted counsel in the proceeding at hand, not for a 
defendant to have had counsel in all prior convictions on which the current charges are 
premised.96  
                                                 
85 Id. at 1964–65. 
86 Id. at 1965. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 





94 Id. at 1967 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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Justice Thomas then addressed Indian law. He wrote that the case was based on two 
conflicting premises: (1) that Bryant did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
tribal court because Native American tribes have sovereignty, but (2) that the recidivism 
statute with which Bryant was charged exists only because Congress has a great deal of 
power over what happens on Native American reservations.97 In response, Justice 
Thomas stated, “even though tribal prosecutions of tribal members are purportedly the 
apex of tribal sovereignty, Congress can second-guess how tribes prosecute domestic 
abuse perpetrated by Indians against other Indians on Indian land by virtue of its ‘plenary 
power’ over Indian tribes.”98 
Justice Thomas then went on to question the very origins of Congress’s plenary 
power over Native American tribes. Congress’s power over Native American tribes stems 
in part from United States v. Kagama. Justice Thomas quoted the justification for this 
power provided by the Court in Kagama as justification for giving Congress said power: 
“The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, 
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection . . . It must exist in 
that government, because it has never existed anywhere else.”99 Justice Thomas was very 
skeptical of this precedent as a basis for Congressional power over Native American 
tribes and was skeptical of the idea of Congressional plenary power over Native 
American tribes in general.100 He also questioned the federal government’s treatment of 
all Native American tribes as a monolith, with each having the same claim to sovereignty 
as every other tribe.101 
 
III. ANALYZING BRYANT 
 
The Court’s opinion in Bryant presents two rationales for its holding that 
uncounseled tribal court convictions can be used in subsequent federal court indictments 
under recidivist statutes such as § 117(a). There is the legal rationale, in which the Court 
reconciles the holdings in Burgett and Nichols to find that the two can be read in concert 
to reach the Court’s holding. Then there is the public policy rationale, in which the Court 
makes a case for how important it is for tribal court convictions to be valid for use in an 
indictment or conviction under § 117(a). 
The Court devotes more space in the opinion to the legal side of its reasoning than 
to the public policy angle. In fact, for the most part, the problems associated with 
domestic assault against Native American women and enforcing laws against it are laid 
out as facts in one section of the opinion and are never connected to the Court’s rationale 
for its decision.102 At first glance, it may seem that public policy considerations played 
little or even no part in the Court’s decision in Bryant.  
However, a closer look at the legal rationale behind the Court’s holding reveals that 
while there is a sound doctrinal and precedential basis for the Court’s decision, the legal 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886)). 
100 Id. at 1969. 
101 Id. at 1968. 
102 See id. at 1965–66.  




issues in play, particularly the intersection of the Court’s decisions in Burgett and 
Nichols, are not as black and white as the opinion and the Court’s unanimity may 
suggest. Further, in considering that this ruling by the Court expanded federal power over 
Native American tribes, it seems even more surprising that all eight sitting justices agreed 
on the outcome, since expansion of federal power is generally a hotly contested issue 
between liberal and conservative justices.103 
In looking closely at the facts and the law in Bryant, it becomes apparent that there 
were holes in the government’s argument and valid points made by Bryant that, had the 
Court been receptive to them, could have stood as a basis for an equally valid opinion 
with an opposite holding in this case. The Court distinguished Bryant from Burgett and 
analogized it to Nichols in order to make the case that, like in Nichols, the use of the 
uncounseled prior conviction was valid for Bryant’s subsequent indictment.104 However, 
the analogy to Nichols was addressed in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Bryant’s appeal 
from his conviction in district court, and the Ninth Circuit found the analogy lacking. The 
Ninth Circuit wrote, “Nichols involved a prior conviction that did comport with the Sixth 
Amendment, whereas this case involves prior convictions obtained under procedures that, 
if utilized in state or federal court, would have violated the Sixth Amendment.”105 The 
Ninth Circuit held that for a tribal court conviction to be used in subsequent proceedings, 
the tribal court would have to “guarantee[] a right to counsel that is, at minimum, 
coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right.”106 
If the stipulation that a tribal court should offer a right to counsel equivalent to the 
Sixth Amendment sounds familiar, that is because it is the same as the burden the federal 
government currently places on Native American tribes in order for tribal courts to be 
able to impose sentences of incarceration for longer than one year.107 Because the federal 
government already requires tribal courts to provide defendants with a right to counsel 
that is coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to gain increased sentencing power, it is 
not unreasonable to impose a lesser requirement (since for increased sentencing power 
the right to counsel is only one requirement among five) for tribal court rulings to have 
increased weight in subsequent federal convictions. 
The Court dismissed Bryant’s argument that tribal courts may be less reliable than 
state or federal courts as a reason that the Court should not allow uncounseled tribal court 
convictions to stand as a basis for his conviction under a recidivist statute.108 It stated that 
“there is no reason to suppose that tribal court proceedings are less reliable when a 
sentence of one year’s imprisonment is imposed than when the punishment is merely a 
                                                 
103 In this instance, “liberal” and “conservative” refer to judicially, not ideologically, liberal and 
conservative justices. In relevant part, judicially “liberal” (sometimes described as “activist”) justices tend 
to favor expansion of federal power, whereas judicially “conservative” justices tend to favor limiting 
federal power in favor of more power being given to the states. See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and 
Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1197–99 (discussing different operational definitions for 
“conservative” judges). 
104 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1965. 
105 Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677. 
106 Id. 
107 See 25 U.S.C § 1302. 
108 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1966. 
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fine.”109 This statement is completely at odds with § 1302, which strongly implies that 
tribal courts are less reliable than state or federal courts by imposing heightened 
procedural requirements on tribal courts in order for them to be able to impose prison 
sentences of longer than one year or fines greater than $5,000.110 
The Court went so far as to state that “we see no cause to distinguish for § 117(a) 
purposes between valid but uncounseled convictions resulting in a fine and valid but 
uncounseled convictions resulting in imprisonment not exceeding one year.”111 This 
statement is even more at odds with the idea that tribal courts are reliable enough to 
impose sentences of one year or less, but not reliable enough to impose sentences of up to 
three years. If anything, a more sensible distinction would be between any sentence of 
incarceration and any fine, rather than the arbitrary line between one year and three years 
of incarceration. To an individual facing any of the above penalties, the former 
distinction would certainly make far more sense than the latter. 
 
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES 
 
All this is not to say that the Court reached the wrong conclusion in Bryant. On the 
contrary, the decision in Bryant was a potential matter of life or death for thousands of 
Native American women. Before the case was decided, the Lakota People’s Law Project 
noted that the stakes were enormous for the Native American community: “If the 
Supreme Court rules in favor of Bryant, then tribal court convictions would not be able to 
count towards habitual offender status, making it much easier for abusers to get away 
with their crimes in Native communities.”112 
 The seriousness of the endemic problem of domestic violence against Native 
American women cannot be overstated. The Supreme Court acknowledged the severity of 
the problem in its ruling in Bryant.113 However, two paragraphs simply cannot paint a 
complete picture of how dire the situation truly is for many Native American women. 
 A 1999 Department of Justice (DOJ) report found that “rates of violent 
victimization were higher for Native women than for all other groups in the United 
States.”114 This was true despite a DOJ finding that 70% of sexual assaults against Native 
American women are never reported.115 
 Most violence against Native American women is committed by non-Native 
Americans.116 Native American women suffered intimate partner rape at a 15.9% rate, 
while 75% of Native American women who are victims of homicide are killed by 
someone they know, with that person being a family member one-third of the time.117 
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Understanding the roots of violence against Native American women is key in 
understanding why the federal government has a responsibility to take a role in protecting 
Native American women and why the Supreme Court in Bryant affirmed that 
responsibility 
The colonization of Native American tribes by the United States had disastrous 
results on Native American peoples and cultures. One of the most severe ill effects of 
colonization was the destruction of traditional family life and community support 
systems.118 Some Native American tribes that had matriarchal structures or that afforded 
women more rights than white society did at the time of colonization were forced to 
conform to stricter patriarchal gender roles, which resulted in greater oppression of 
Native American women.119 When women in a society are more oppressed, violence 
against them, particularly sexual and domestic violence, becomes more pronounced, 
because these forms of violence are used as an assertion of power over women120.  
 Additionally, colonization devastated Native American communities 
economically. Bubar and Thurman note that “violence against women is an issue for all 
classes,” but “poverty remains a stressor that likely increases the likelihood of violence. 
Native Americans with incomes of less than $10,000 per year have experienced the 
highest rate of violent victimization.”121 These conditions may result in “internalized 
oppression and the normalization of violence” in Native American communities.122 
 As referenced above, ineffective enforcement is another significant feature 
contributing to violence against Native American women. The Court noted in Bryant that 
“the complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law governing Indian country has 
made it difficult to stem the tide of domestic violence experienced by Native American 
women.”123 A lack of enforcement and punishment is almost certainly part of the reason 
that Native American women suffer violence at such shockingly high rates, and likely 
contributes to the normalization of violence against women in Native American 
communities. 
 It is not surprising that the Court would feel compelled to take action to ensure 
greater protections for Native American women in light of the federal government’s role 
in the colonization of Native American peoples, which likely contributed in large part to 
the rates of violence experienced by Native American women. Considering the mess of 
enforcement issues also at play, it is even less surprising that the Court would 
unanimously decide in a way that serves to simplify the enforcement scheme for 
domestic violence against Native American women. 
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V. THE COURT’S COOPERATION 
 
A further explanation behind the Court’s ruling may come from the unified front 
presented by Congress and President Obama at the time of Bryant. When the other two 
branches of government are in clear agreement about what the law should look like for a 
particular issue, it is highly unlikely that the Court will rule against them both. This 
would take the Court into the territory of making the law—a risk the Court generally does 
not like to take, and certainly would not take without protest from judicially conservative 
justices.124 In the case of Bryant, Congress and the President were in agreement that 
violence against Native American women was an issue that needed to be addressed and 
that greater enforcement was an appropriate way of addressing it.  
Congress clearly signaled its support for this approach to the issue in passing 
§ 117(a). The statute is specifically designed to protect victims of domestic assault in 
“Indian country” and explicitly includes convictions in tribal court as prerequisites for 
conviction under the new habitual offender statute.125 In the Court’s opinion in Bryant, it 
quotes Senator John McCain’s remarks on the Senate floor about the seriousness of 
domestic violence against Native American women.126  
President Obama also unequivocally supported strengthening protections for Native 
American women by closing gaps in the law. In a statement released by the White House 
after President Obama signed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, 
the White House quoted the President as saying that “tribal governments have an inherent 
right to protect their people, and all women deserve the right to live free from fear. And 
that is what today is all about.”127 Although the President did not express his support for 
§ 117(a) specifically, he made it clear that he prioritized giving tribal governments the 
necessary power to protect women from domestic violence. In hearing and deciding 
Bryant within the same presidential term, the Court certainly knew where the President 
and the executive branch stood on this issue.  
 
VI. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS 
 
Native American groups and activists were strongly in favor of the Court’s ruling 
in Bryant.128 It closed a gap in Indian law that left Native American women, arguably the 
most vulnerable population in the United States, in more danger of domestic violence by 
making the consequences for their abusers relatively light. However, Justice Thomas 
made an excellent and thought-provoking point in his concurrence about the absurdity 
inherent in the Court’s decision in Bryant and in much of Indian law. The contradiction 
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between the concepts of tribal sovereignty and federal power over Native American tribes 
was the only reason this case came about.129 
Scholars from legal and social science disciplines have examined the contradiction 
between tribal sovereignty and the federal government’s plenary power over tribes and 
have found the two truths hard to reconcile. Wilkins writes, “[t]here is also considerable 
disagreement among scholars on whether plenary power is a necessary congressional 
power which protects tribes, or whether it is an abhorrent and undemocratic concept 
because it entails the congressional exercise of wide political authority over tribes.”130  
In this particular case, what is good for the physical safety of Native American 
women may not necessarily be good for Native American tribes on the whole, if their 
desire is to expand their sovereignty and lessen the federal government’s control over 
their affairs. The decision in Bryant was meant to make Native American women safer, 
but the mechanism for doing so was to give the federal government even more power to 
prosecute crimes committed on Native American land. 
This raises the question: is there a solution that could both protect Native American 
women from domestic and other forms of violence against them, while avoiding erosion 
of tribal sovereignty? Some of the major issues with enforcement stem from a lack of 
resources on tribal lands. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found:  
 
[P]olicing, justice, and corrections [] are substandard in Indian country as compared 
with the rest of the nation. Native Americans are twice as likely as any other 
racial/ethnic group to be the victims of crimes. Yet per capita spending on law 
enforcement in Native American communities is roughly 60% of the national 
average. Correctional facilities in Indian Country are more overcrowded than even 
the most crowded state and federal prisons.131 
 
Additionally, “Native Americans are incarcerated at a rate 38% higher than the 
national per capita rate.”132  
Looking at these facts together, it seems unlikely that either more sovereignty for 
Native American tribes or more federal government enforcement will be able to solve the 
issue of domestic violence against Native American women. On one hand, Native 
American reservations do not have the resources to implement effective enforcement and 
protection for Native American women under the current system.133 In one roundtable 
discussion, Native American women expressed feelings of having little power in tribal 
decision-making systems.134 They felt that tribal law enforcement and judges were 
uneducated about domestic violence and sometimes engaged in victim-blaming.135 
Research suggests that the inability of many tribal governments to address crime 
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“significantly harms American Indian and Alaska Native women in particular.”136 If 
tribal sovereignty were simply expanded, tribal law enforcement would likely be unable 
to cope with the increased responsibility. This could have the effect of worsening the 
problem for Native American women. 
On the other hand, increasing federal government power to enforce the law on 
Native American reservations may also have negative, unintended consequences for 
Native American women. Native Americans are incarcerated at a rate higher than the 
national rate per capita, which may be one reason for Native American women to distrust 
federal law enforcement, preventing them from reporting crimes to federal law 
enforcement.137 Hypothetically, if Native American women think that federal law 
enforcement is prejudiced against Native Americans, they may not trust the system to 
care about them enough to actually help them, and they may not trust the system enough 
to deal with their abusers fairly. Particularly in domestic violence situations, where the 
victim may feel some attachment to their abuser, this loyalty may prevent Native 
American women from seeking help from the federal government. Additionally, some of 
the same complaints Native American women have about judges engaging in victim-
blaming and being poorly educated on issues of domestic violence have been lodged 
against both state and federal judges.138 
However, the history of colonization is a larger factor contributing to Native 
American women’s distrust of the federal government and another reason that expanding 
federal power on tribal reservations may not have the desired effect. White colonizers 
used government agencies, including the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Indian Health 
Service, and the Department of Children and Family Services, to oppress Native 
American people.139 For instance, the Indian Health Service unnecessarily sterilized 
Native American women through coercion in the 1970s.140 Additionally, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs took Native American children from their homes and placed them in 
boarding schools meant to “assimilate them” into white culture by eliminating all traces 
of their Native American culture, often through abuse.141  
Abused Native American women often fear that the state will take their children 
away.142 This fear stems from multiple sources. The first is the historical context outlined 
above—Native American children were taken away from their families in the past as part 
of an effort to stamp out Native American tribes by robbing their children of their racial 
and cultural identity.143 The problem is not confined to history. To this day, Native 
American children are removed from their homes more frequently per capita than 
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children of all other races.144 Harmful stereotypes about Native Americans and 
particularly Native American women may contribute to this phenomenon. Dominant 
white culture often stereotypes Native American women as lazy, dirty, unintelligent, and 
prone to vices like drinking and gambling.145 Further, it views these women as (1) having 
many children while (2) being less capable of motherly sentiment than white women and 
thus more likely to neglect their children.146  
Finally, mothers who are victims of domestic abuse often have their children taken 
away and, in some cases, have their parental rights terminated for allowing their children 
to be exposed to domestic abuse, even if the children were never abused by the mother’s 
violent partner.147 Historical abuse and oppression of Native Americans by the federal 
government, coupled with states’ propensity to take children away from victims of 
domestic abuse, would make it very difficult for Native American women to turn to the 
federal government for protection from domestic violence if that became their only 
avenue. 
Although the Court in Bryant attempted to address the issue of domestic violence 
against Native American women through increasing federal power over Native American 
tribes, the best way to effectively handle this issue may be to look to Native American 
women themselves to determine their ideal solution. At one roundtable, Native American 
women said that they felt like an afterthought to discussions and policy meetings in 
Washington D.C. and within academia on this issue.148 However, Native American 
women have valuable ideas on how they can be better protected by the tribes and the 
government. 
Although Justice Thomas used the diversity of Native American tribes to support 
this argument that not all tribes should have uniform sovereignty in his concurrence, most 
Native Americans would agree with him that treating tribes as a monolith for the sake of 
solving the issue of violence against Native American women simply will not work; 
domestic violence law scholar Nancy K.D. Lemon noted that “the diversity of tribes and 
the community milieu in which native women live today are a challenge for devising 
programs.”149 However, contrary to Justice Thomas’s implication that the solution to 
tribal differences is to accord some tribes less sovereignty than others, the consensus in 
Native American communities is that the best approach to the problem is to give each 
tribe enough sovereignty to determine what will work best within their culture to end 
abuse.150 
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 Researchers in this area have approached Native American women for their 
suggestions and have come away with many examples of culturally sensitive programs 
that Native American women have formulated through their own tribal culture. Some of 
these include “strategies that address intergenerational trauma and decolonization efforts 
that empower and move the community in a meaningful way to address violence in 
Native communities”;151 interventions that do not involve the traditional justice system 
and instead emphasize restorative and reparative justice;152 and the introduction of tribal 
codes that are “grounded in the traditional willingness of tribes to respect women in 
complementary roles which promote tribal well-being.”153  
Many Native Americans believe that violence against women is not a part of their 
tribes’ traditional values, and a return to those values, “such as those which stress family 
and clan honor, should help to alleviate problems associated with the physical and 
psychological abuse of female tribal members.”154 While eschewing traditional criminal 
justice methods may not eliminate all domestic violence against Native American 
women, some argue that doing so would allow tribes to balance the “distinct, important 
interests” of “sovereignty and security of the victim’s person.”155  
Each of the above strategies suggested by Native American women can be tailored 
to a tribe’s specific cultural background and practices to achieve maximum effectiveness 
in that culture. Native American women, the people closest to the problem of domestic 
violence in Native American communities, feel that a one-size-fits-all strategy of either 
more tribal sovereignty or more federal government enforcement will not help them in 
the ways that they and their communities most need, particularly considering the 
aforementioned problems with each system. Allowing the women most affected by this 
problem to work together to construct their own novel methods and systems for 
protecting themselves from domestic violence may be more likely to yield results that are 
more beneficial to women not only as victims of domestic violence, but as members of 




The Court showed its willingness to respond to the dire public policy concerns in 
its decision in Bryant, chiefly the widespread problem of domestic violence against 
Native American women and how best to protect them in a system of complex tribal and 
federal laws. The precedent on whether uncounseled tribal court convictions can be used 
in subsequent federal proceedings under a federal recidivist statute had resulted in a 
circuit split on the issue of whether it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment to charge a 
defendant under a federal recidivism statute when the underlying convictions were 
uncounseled convictions in tribal courts. The Court unanimously decided that 
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uncounseled tribal court convictions could be used to convict Bryant and others under 
federal habitual offender statutes like § 117(a). 
It is clear from the opinion that the Court was aware of the seriousness of the issue 
of domestic violence against Native American women. It is also clear that the Court was 
aware that the legislative and executive branches were of one mind on this issue, based 
on public statements by President Obama and Congress’s passage of the statute in 
question in the first instance. The alignment of the other two branches of government 
may have played a part in the Court’s unanimity in this case.  
Although the Court’s decision in Bryant was celebrated by Native American and 
domestic violence advocates alike, there is still plenty of room for the Court and the 
government to improve its response to the problem of domestic violence against Native 
American women. Justice Thomas’s concurrence pointed out the conflict in Indian law 
between tribal sovereignty and the federal government’s plenary power over Native 
American tribes. He also noted that not all tribes are alike, and they should not be treated 
as such.  
Justice Thomas’s thoughts in his concurrence are very similar to the thoughts 
expressed by Native American women in the aforementioned roundtable discussion on 
this subject. They would likely agree that tribal sovereignty and federal plenary power are 
concepts at odds with each other and make strange bedfellows as the basis for § 117(a) 
and Indian law in general. They would also agree that attempting to solve the issue of 
domestic violence against Native American women by applying the same solution to all 
tribes is not an effective plan. 
Native American women, in some ways, are stuck between a history of abuse 
coming from both members of their own tribes and the federal government. When faced 
with the choice at the heart of Bryant—whether to trust the justice system in place in the 
tribes or the government with more power to protect Native American women from 
domestic abuse—some Native American would choose neither. Rather, they would 
choose to work within their communities to create community-based solutions 
individualized to suit the needs and cultures of their tribes, relying on their own 
experiences of what works and what does not to make themselves and other women safer. 
The Court’s reliance on public policy concerns about domestic violence against Native 
American women in deciding Bryant was appropriate. However, like the issues in Bryant, 
the solution to violence against Native American women is more complicated than it 
appears on the surface.  
The Court was limited in Bryant to a decision between increased or decreased 
federal jurisdiction over tribal lands. This was due to the adversarial nature of the United 
States justice system. Even though the Court acknowledged the severity of the problem of 
violence against Native American women, and Justice Thomas in his concurrence drew 
attention to the paradox of tribal sovereignty, the Court had to choose between a decision 
that would either protect women while undermining tribal sovereignty, or bolster tribal 
sovereignty at the risk of leaving Native American women vulnerable. 
 Because of their sovereignty, Native American tribes are in a unique position to 
craft their justice systems to be more restorative than adversarial. Historically, the federal 
government has pushed back against Native American tribes taking an approach to 
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criminal justice that differs too much from the federal system.156 However, if tribes are 
given some latitude to experiment, it may be possible to create innovative solutions to the 
epidemic of domestic violence in Native America. For example, tribes could experiment 
with systems for law enforcement and dispute resolution that are unique to their tribal 
culture and created with the collaboration of women who are at risk of domestic violence 
in those communities. Such solutions would not only protect women, but do so while 
respecting tribal culture and sovereignty.  
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